高雄公佳當舖

          中國與英國核武戰略及態勢比較 Chapter 1 Introduction ___________________________________________________________________ Historically, attention has mainly centred on nuclear strategies and force postures of the two Cold War Superpowers, which have possessed the largest nuclear inventories in the world. The attention paid to other nuclear weapons states,[1] by comparison, has been relatively limited. More seriously, there is a dearth of research, which has satisfactorily ventured into the realm of comparative studies of nuclear strategies between medium-size nuclear powers. In view of this, this comparative study of British and Chinese nuclear strategies and force postures aims not only comprehensively to revisit the evolution of nuclear strategies of both countries, but also analytically to compare Western and Eastern nuclear force postures that in many ways are so different. The substance of nuclear strategy is so complicated that even the most detailed dictionary of military terms fails to list its definition.[2] In order to properly explore the essence of British and Chinese nuclear strategies and force postures, this book will provide four indispensable aspects as discussion forums for the two cases under review. In addition to the Introduction and the Conclusions, this book comprises four major parts: Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Doctrines, Special Nuclear Relationships, and Command, Control and Operations. In Chapter Two, evolution of British and Chinese strategic nuclear systems, which physically constitute their nuclear assets, is discussed. The adoption of major nuclear systems reflects not only the strategic preference for chosen systems, but also the capacities by which a state materialises its resources into nuclear strength. Under a comparative framework, Chapter Two contrasts two different paths of development, as well as the strategic and financial concerns of each case. After discussing the hardware of nuclear forces, Chapter Three deals with the software part, strategic doctrines, which provide the intellectual, political and military guidance for nuclear decision-makers. Unsurprisingly, Britain and China did not share much in terms of nuclear doctrines and policies although sometimes they were placed in similar circumstances. Relations with the Superpowers, influenced by diverse variables, are examined in Chapter Four. Such relations, which present a political and diplomatic dimension of nuclear strategy, are unique and complicated, but without comparative scrutiny, further understanding cannot be achieved. The last, but definitely not least important topic, which covers nuclear command, control, targeting and operations, is left to Chapter Five. These issues, which are more or less military-oriented, contain practical schemes for achieving nuclear strategic and tactical objectives. Examining these subjects is helpful not only to unfold the strategic priorities a nuclear weapons state has set, but also to assess the credibility of the existing or underlying strategic doctrines it has declared. This book aims to provide a comprehensive comparison of the two cases under review. Individually, each chapter represents a study of a particular issue based on available literature, together with critical analysis and evaluation. Collectively, this arrangement attempts to c 膠原蛋白over as many influential factors as possible in order systematically to compare the two different medium size nuclear powers. These tasks are challenging, but by no means a mission impossible. I have no intention to rewrite the history radically, but it is my hope that this book can bridge the gap in the current understanding of the both cases by a new comparative approach. Chapter 2 Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Weapons ___________________________________________________________________ An examination of the evolution of strategic nuclear weapons is an indispensable approach to analyse how a state transforms its nuclear potential into real strength. In this chapter, the major focus will be placed on a historical investigation as well as an analytical comparison of strategic nuclear weapons developments in Britain and China. Tactical nuclear weapons will be mentioned, but more concisely. This chapter is not intended to provide exhaustive descriptions on both cases because the function of this chapter is to serve as background knowledge to understand nuclear strategies and force postures of Britain and China. It is not designed to compile all existing data. 2-1 Britain 2-1-1 V-bombers The development of nuclear weapons in Britain, as one of the Big Three, could be traced back as early as the early 1940s. According the 1941 MAUD report, the atomic bomb was technically feasible and could be ready by the end of 1943 at an estimated cost of ￡5 million.[3] Nonetheless, Britain’s indigenous efforts to build atomic bombs were frustrated due to the course of the war. The UK eventually decided to cooperate with the Americans, and the British scientists made significant contributions to the final success of the Manhattan Project. After WWII, as a result of the shift of the American policy and passage of the McMahon Act of 1946, the British-American interaction and sharing on atomic energy, and most importantly, nuclear weapons, were temporarily suspended. Without American assistance, the British still decided to go alone for their own bombs.[4] After years of endeavour, at Monte Bello, Australia on 3 October 1952, Britain exploded its first atomic device,[5] and officially became the third member of the nuclear club. The British acquired thermonuclear technology,[6] and after something of a false start in the only partially successful tests in May 1957 on Malden Island,[7] they successfully exploded their first prototype megaton range H-bomb in November of that year in the Grapple-X trials near Christmas Island. In April 1958, the British exploded the Grapple-Y device of 3-megaton, the highest yield of all the British test devices. After completing the Grapple-Z trials in September 1958, the British had the ability of making the invulnerable (or immune) 1-ton/1-megaton nuclear weapon, which was viewed as the ultimate objective of the four Grapple series.[8] To obtain a credible nuclear deterrent, the delivery systems are as important as, if not more so than, the bomb itself. To select the first generation strategic delivery system did not encounter too much difficulty in Whitehall. The initial nuclear posture of the UK was reflected by its preference for air power. Similar to the US 商務中心 Strategic Air Command (SAC), in Britain, Bomber Command and its incoming V-bombers naturally assumed the core deterrent task in the 1950s,[9] and unsurprisingly, the RAF was granted the lion’s share of the defence budget.[10] As early as July 1946, the Cabinet Defence Committee had given high priority to the development of long range bombers and the Air Staff put out a requirement on 1 January 1947 for aircraft two or three times more effective than contemporary bombers in altitude, speed and range. In view of the technological improvement, it was anticipated that both Britain’s first bomb and delivery systems would be available in the mid-1950s.[11] The so-called V-bombers comprised three different models: Valiant, Victor, and Vulcan. To meet the Air Staff requirements for advanced bombers, proposals were submitted by Vickers, Handley Page and Avro and were examined in detail. All three appeared to be excellent designs and met the required operational specifications. The Air Council, led by Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor as Chief of the Air Staff, decided to order all three types. Vickers’ design, Valiant, was to be produced first on high priority as an interim aircraft in place of the less sophisticated Sperrin; the other two were to follow as quickly as possible. Avro’s proposal, Vulcan, was a more advanced design for a high-performance four-engine jet bomber, incorporating a delta-wing structure and other new features. Its range and load carrying capacity were far greater than anything previously operated by the RAF in any role. Handley Page’s Victor was no less impressive. This was a crescent-wing concept, not previously used in any bomber design, and its performance also met Air Staff requirements.[12] In November 1953, the first production warheads, Blue Danube, based on the test device exploded in the previous year, were issued to the military although at that time, the RAF had no aircraft immediately capable of carrying them,[13] and Britain’s deterrence still required the US strategic air power.[14] The first squadron of the V-bombers was introduced in 1955.[15] In the next year, Britain obtained an operational nuclear capacity with Valiant and Blue Danube. The yield of these production weapons was limited to 10 kilotons (a little less than the Hiroshima bomb) in order to economise on fissile material for providing more weapons.[16] Later, higher yield American bombs were provided to the RAF via Project E, but they were under the strict US control and custodianship. With the V-bombers as a major deterrent, other weapons systems were introduced in Britain during the late 1950s. An Anglo-American agreement was negotiated in 1957-58, which allowed the US to base 60 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a liquid-fuelled system with a range of 2,800 kilometres (1,500 nautical miles) and a full megaton range thermonuclear warhead in eastern England. The Thor missiles, which were deployed in unhardened sites and had a slow reaction time, were operated by Bomber Command on a “dual key” basis, whereby American and British authorisation was required before missiles could be launched. Thor was operational from 1960 to early 1963. While it made a significant numerical contribution to Britain’s strategic deterrence, nevertheless, there were always doubts 會場佈置about its utility as a second strike force, and the likelihood of inviting a pre-emptive strike, at grave danger to British territory.[17] The beginning of the 1960s marked the decline of Bomber Command. Its budget shrank from 10 per cent of the defence expenditure in the 1950s to 2-4 per cent.[18] It was thought that the attrition rate of the V-bombers would be dangerously high: a possibility of 70-90 per cent loss as the Soviet air defence systems improved.[19] The V-force reached its highest numerical strength at the beginning of the 1960s with a maximum front line of 180.[20] Members of the V-bombers family were fitted to carry the full range of British free-fall weapons, including Blue Danube, Red Beard, Violet Club, Yellow Sun MKI, Yellow Sun MKII, the WE177s as well as the stand-off rocket Blue Steel.[21] In 1968, Bomber Command was abolished and incorporated into Strike Command. In the wake of the reorganisation and the loss of “strategic” nuclear function to the RN in 1969, the RAF hoped to maintain an air delivered capability for as long as possible.[22] The remaining WE177-equipped Vulcan bombers were assigned to Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR).[23] The RAF managed to retain a theatre (later “sub-strategic”) nuclear role beyond 1982 with the WE177s, both low and high yields, carried by Jaguar and Tornado.[24] After the official retirement of the WE177 on 31 March 1998, the RAF no longer possessed nuclear weapons. 2-1-2 Polaris Although before the relaxation of the McMahon Act, the British had only limited access to US knowledge of nuclear weapons, the RN was aware of the existence of the ongoing Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system from its inception.[25] Foreseeing the budgetary difficulty but encouraged by the Americans,[26] First Sea Lord Mountbatten knew that it would not be easy to sell Polaris at home, especially as the Government in 1956 had announced the development of Blue Streak, a liquid-fuelled IRBM, on which work had begun as early as 1953.[27] As the Soviet missiles improved, Blue Streak was undermined as a credible deterrent system. Firstly, Blue Streak, closely related to the US Atlas ballistic missile,[28] would have to be placed in hardened underground silos built at high costs, which were far over what the Treasury was willing to pay.[29] Secondly, the liquid-fuelled Blue Streak missiles would need 10-15 minutes to prepare for launching. The long reaction time would make Britain defenceless against pre-emptive strikes by the Soviet ballistic missiles. Thirdly, installing fixed-site rockets near the large centres of populations would cause public anxiety. Worries about countervalue attacks strengthened the opposition for Blue Streak.[30] Finally, due to the departure of powerful supporters such as Duncan Sandys and Sir Frederick Brundrett, the Chief Scientist, the Blue Streak project became less viable than ever. On 24 February 1960, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet reached a decision to cancel Blue Streak. The option of Polaris soon emerged, although at that time, many people in the RN preferred to leave the deterrent role to the RAF. In the meanwhile, there were also other competitors under consideration, such as America’s Skybolt, extensively lobbied for by the Air Ministry. Skybolt, initially as solution 酒店經紀 to the OR 1159 requirement (Blue Steel MK2), was an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that could be fitted to the V-bombers as a successor to Blue Steel. With a minimum range of 1,850 kilometres (1,000 nautical miles),[31] Skybolt offered a high chance of penetrating Soviet defences, but combining a ballistic missile with a high speed launch platform posed significant problems. Its efficacy beyond the mid-1960s was also in doubt. Nevertheless, a Skybolt technical agreement was signed on 23 September 1960 between London and Washington, and in exchange, the British offered the Americans a base in Holy Loch for the Atlantic Polaris submarine force. The US, however, cancelled Skybolt in December 1962. In spite of previous signs of cancellation, Macmillan and his colleagues were left feeling helpless. Although the RAF asked if Skybolt was delayed or cancelled, a ram-jet-powered cruise missile Pandora be procured in its place, Defence Minister Harold Watkinson had concluded that the Government would purchase Polaris instead.[32] The ALBM was therefore out of contention. With the cancellation of Skybolt, as the main candidate for Britain’s future nuclear deterrent, Polaris itself still faced a series of difficulties. The first was undoubtedly the budgetary concern. It was estimated that Polaris would cost at least 3 per cent of annual defence budget (￡60 million) over 20 years.[33] Although this could be lower than the whole V-bomber projects, no service, especially the RN, would expect the deterrent money be spent completely from its own pocket. Unable to seek extra money from the Treasury to fund Polaris, Defence Minister Peter Thorneycroft decided the three services should evenly share the expenses as “deterrent budget”.[34] The second difficulty was the domestic opposition within the US. In mid-1956, when the British expressed their interest in nuclear-powered submarines, it was Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the founding father of the US nuclear-powered submarines, who adamantly opposed sharing information on propulsion reactors and submarine designs, although he was later persuaded by Lord Mountbatten to agree to this transfer.[35] As for the advanced SLBM, many US officials could feel the urgent need of the British for a nuclear deterrent competent for a new generation, but were concerned that such an agreement would impair their developing relations with the French. The overly close Anglo-American relations and more independent British nuclear force would not help Washington’s political and military arrangements in Europe. Under pressure, the John F. Kennedy Administration offered the British the Hound Dog, another air-launched system instead of Polaris. It was Prime Minister Macmillan, who used his personal influence to let President Kennedy know the political consequence to his Government and himself if the Polaris sale could not be concluded. Fortunately, personal friendship in time prevailed. At Nassau, Bahamas during 18-21 December 1962, the Polaris SLBM transfer to Britain was officially decided. London would procure Polaris missiles from Washington for four submarines, with the reservation for the fifth.[36] In return, the Americans asked the British to assign their Polaris force to SACEUR, but Britain reserved its right to withdraw. Targets were to be allocated by the Joint Strateg 節能燈具ic Nuclear Targeting Staff in Omaha, Nebraska. The lease of the Holy Loch base to the US was also viewed as part of the Nassau agreement. Despite those strings attached, in the eyes of Macmillan, the possession of Polaris would still be an explicit symbol of independence. The final agreement was signed by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore on 6 April 1963. The British seemed to have procured 99 missiles, comprising rocket motors and ancillary equipment, in the first instance.[37] The warhead itself, made in Britain was a version of the high yield WE177 with a physically much smaller primary. Each warhead had an explosive power of 200 kilotons. It was estimated about 150 warheads were produced.[38] The missiles were to be maintained and stored at the Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) at Coulport. They would not be in the submarine during the refit and docking period at Rosyth, and would not be handled either there or at the operating base.[39] The nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), Britain’s largest submarines at that time, were built in Britain with a displacement of 7,500 tons surfaced, 8,400 tons dived, almost twice as large as HMS Dreadnought, Britain’s first nuclear-powered submarine (SSN). According to Eric Grove, the reactor section, similar to that of HMS Valiant, was grafted on to the US designed missile compartment, which had been manufactured by the UK, building a new forward section to house both the forward torpedo tubes and sonar equipment.[40] Each boat could carry a maximum of 16 Polaris missiles with range of 4,600 kilometres (2,500 nautical miles).[41] Orders were placed for the first two submarines Resolution and Repulse from the lead yard, Vickers-Armstrong in Barrow-in-Furness, whilst Renown and Revenge were built at Birkenhead by Camell-Laird.[42] HMS Resolution was launched on 15 September 1966. She was commissioned on 2 October 1967. By the following October, Resolution began her first operational patrol. HMS Repulse was commissioned at the same time in 1968.[43] Two months later, HMS Renown was commissioned. HMS Revenge was completed in December 1969.[44] Six months previously, Polaris boats had officially taken over the nuclear deterrent role from the V-bombers. At least one Polaris submarine would always be on patrol. The Polaris era had begun. For Britain, the Polaris transfer was deemed as a very cost-effective option and lived up to many expectations. Not only did Polaris come earlier than anticipated, but also the British obtained it on extraordinarily inexpensive terms. On a pro rata basis, Britain’s five planned submarines to America’s forty-one, the British only might have to pay 12 per cent of the R&D expenses. In a later agreement, President Kennedy allowed Britain to pay a surcharge of 5 per cent on the final production price of the A-3 missile as a contribution to the massive R&D expenses. Such a favour saved the British a huge expenditure of at least ￡1 billion.[45] Nevertheless, Polaris, advanced as it was, had difficulty in meeting the operational requirements the British needed.[46] As early as 1960, Polaris had been criticised in Parliament as “a crude weapon with a huge margin of error”.[47] Although the Polaris missiles had multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs), they could not place these vehicles indepe 房屋買賣ndently over several separate targets, i. e., were not MIRVed. This meant that each missile, even if it carried a cluster of warheads and decoys, could only attack the area of a single large target, rather than a number of separate targets. As Moscow’s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system developed,[48] there were doubts about its capacity to meet the so-called “Moscow Criterion”. In view of the obsolescence of Polaris, the UK Government for a time considered the MIRVed US Poseidon missile system, which was highly recommended by the Americans. Yet, Poseidon delivered a smaller yield (50 kilotons) than Polaris and produced no significant improvement in terms of range (4,600 kilometres). In addition, Poseidon had been in service since 1971 and would possibly be phased out by the US Navy at the same time as it could be entering operational service with the RN. This would cause a tremendous problem for the British to cooperate with the Americans on logistic and war-planning matters. After assessment and despite much opposition from the RN, the Wilson Government determined to give up the Poseidon option in June 1967,[49] although there was little technological difficulty to Poseidonise the British Polaris fleet.[50] In the late 1960s, the British decided to open a Polaris warhead improvement programme. Studies of Chevaline (a.k.a. “Super Antelope” or “KH793”) were made in 1967 and the decision to proceed was made by the first Wilson Government that same year.[51] The Chevaline concept was defined in 1969 and the system had been worked out in detail in 1972. By incorporating the latest American advances in weight reduction and warhead hardening, it has been said that Britain “probably succeeded in jumping a generation of warhead development.”[52] It was approved for deployment by the Heath Government, and a decision finally ratified by the second Wilson Government in February 1974. The first Chevaline warhead, designated the TK-100, was tested on 23 May 1974, but it was not until 24 January 1980 that the existence of Chevaline was known to the public.[53] The major improvements of Chevaline included: (1) advanced penetration aids and the ability to manoeuvre part of the payload in space; (2) the ability to change course, angle of re-entry into the atmosphere and the speed of descent so as to confuse the enemy; (3) early separation before arriving within the defence range; (4) the inclusion in the re-entry package of a number of decoys with the same features as the genuine articles; and (5) hardening to protect the internal electronics from the impacts of nuclear explosion.[54] Production of the Chevaline warhead ran from the late 1970s to mid-1980s with about 100 warheads being produced.[55] Sea trials of Chevaline were conducted in November 1980. Chevaline went on patrol for the first time in mid-1982 aboard HMS Renown, with deployment completed in 1987.[56] The estimated yield of each Chevaline warhead was 225 kilotons.[57] Each would fly a different trajectory so that all warheads would arrive simultaneously over the target. There were two real warheads (reduced from the three of the Polaris A-3) inside balloons that were indistinguishable from numerous balloon decoys.[58] The system was highly effective, if expensive to develop. 2-1-3 Trident With US progress in technology, the destructive and penetrative capacities o 酒店經紀f the Polaris SLBM were outshone by America’s new military innovations, despite Britain’s Chevaline upgrading programme. Continued supplies of the missiles were also becoming doubtful. With the US withdrawing its last remaining Polaris submarine from service in 1982, Lockheed, the sole manufacturer of the missiles, would feel no need to keep its production line open simply for its British clients.[59] In that case, the UK would have to rely on stocked missiles whose solid-fuels were to expire after about 10 years of preservation, and the rocket motors, fire control mechanism, and electronic components would be subject to wear and tear.[60] In addition to the missiles, the submarines had their own problems. The original estimate of the operational life of the Polaris boats was 20 years, and on that basis, they would need to be replaced around 1990.[61] Maintenance of older boats would be more expensive and time-consuming. Older hulls were inevitably noisier, both in absolute terms as they aged, and relative to new designs. This would reduce the operational flexibility and strategic value of the Polaris fleet. When James Callaghan succeeded Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in 1976, his Government faced the issue of deciding on a successor to Polaris. In January 1978, Callaghan commissioned studies for the options for replacing Polaris. A small informal group of ministers was set up and its very existence was kept from the rest of the Cabinet. The group, consisting of Callaghan, Foreign Minister David Owen, Chancellor Denis Healey, and Defence Minister Fred Mulley quickly determined that a new system should be acquired, although it was not decided whether this would be Trident. Although at that time the overall international situation was different from that in the early 1960s when the Polaris procurement had been negotiated, the domestic debates for its successor were no less fierce. For example, former Foreign Minister David Owen regarded the Moscow Criterion as a misguided Whitehall orthodoxy, and believed that Polaris submarines could be made to last long after their end-of-life in 1993. Running them on would ensure that full value was obtained for the money the Government had agreed to spend on Chevaline, which then was still years away from entering service. In terms of the Polaris successor, if required, Owen, with the support of Lord Zuckerman, subscribed to the cruise missile alternative.[62] According to these proponents, the cruise missile could provide tactics of multiplication and dispersion. Better, cruise missiles could be easily adapted by existing aircraft and could be launched from submarines, either from dedicated launchers or from torpedo tubes.[63] The MoD, however, favoured the Trident ballistic missile system rather than cruise missiles.[64] It argued that cruise missiles were slow (sub-sonic) and too vulnerable for the core strategic role. The MoD also believed that cruise missiles might be cheaper than ballistic missiles individually, but to procure a working cruise missile force, which could be comparable to Polaris, not to mention a Trident flotilla, would require more missiles and accordingly more launch platforms.[65] Apart from cruise missiles, there were proposals for British-made ballistic missiles to replace Polaris. Thanks to the Chevaline experience, however, the possibility of developing a British missile wa 房地產s discounted. Britain could hardly afford the combination of cost, time-scale and technical risk.[66] The idea of modifying Polaris boats was also submitted. It was argued that the US had converted 12 of its Lafayette class submarines, originally carrying Polaris, to accommodate Trident. There was no reason why the British Resolution class submarines could not be converted to do so.[67] Supporters were convinced that although the costs of modification would rise disproportionately with the life of system, it could overall be much cheaper than procuring Trident.[68] However, the problem of modification was that this option would only be viable if Polaris could continue to serve as an effective deterrent beyond 2010. That was also a risky strategy, which the Government was not prepared to accept.[69] The Conservative victory in May 1979 brought back to office a Government committed to the future of deterrence. To examine a replacement for Polaris/Chevaline, Margaret Thatcher established a Cabinet Committee, MISC 7.[70] This Committee comprised Thatcher herself, Defence Minister Francis Pym, Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, Chancellor Sir Geoffrey Howe and Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw. On 6 December 1979, a formal decision was made by MISC 7 to procure the Trident C-4 system, minus the warheads and submarines which would be built in the UK.[71] When the decision for Trident had been made, the rest would be left for negotiations with the Americans. Unlike the Polaris transfer, the Trident deal was much easier to make. After years of cooperation, the US had little doubt on Britain’s idea of an “independent nuclear deterrent”. A refusal to sell Trident would simply alienate the British. Meanwhile, a promotion of Britain’s nuclear capabilities would be positive for the West-East strategic balance. When the Soviet Union had been planning to deploy the new SS-20 missiles in Europe,[72] Britain’s Trident could help to penetrate the Soviet ABM defences and to deliver reliable strikes on Moscow, if needed. On 15 July 1980, the UK Government released the texts of letters exchanged between Prime Minster Thatcher and President Jimmy Carter confirming that Britain would purchase the Trident C-4 missile for a force of British-built SSBNs to replace the Polaris fleet. The missiles, together with equipment and supporting services, would be supplied on a similar basis to Polaris.[73] This meant that Britain only had to pay 5 per cent of the R&D costs and was also expected to provide the air defence for American bases in Britain.[74] The Thatcher Government stressed that the Trident decision was one that was commensurate with a policy extending back over 40 years, and had been embraced by both the Conservative and Labour parties.[75] By October 1981, a new problem emerged. New US President Ronald Reagan came to office on a platform that included a rapid increase in American military power. An important element of this ambition was to be the early replacement of the Trident C-4 missile with a new D-5 version, which was a generation ahead of the C-4 and two generations ahead of Polaris. Such a change would obviously affect the previous transfer to Britain. This time, the full cabinet was involved in the change to buy the Trident D-5, although they had little choice but to agree. Even so, the decision of switching to the D-5 missile was soon well justified by the MoD by t 買屋he following reasons. (1)The D-5 system would be an evolutionary development, which was significantly larger than the C-4 and would be able either to carry the same payload a much greater distance and with greater accuracy or to carry its maximum payload over approximately the same range as the C-4.[76] (2)The US Navy, which first deployed the C-4 system in 1980, would likely withdraw its last C-4 missiles from service before the introduction of Britain’s forces. The UK might thus become the sole operator of the C-4 and this would give rise to a number of logistic, operational and financial penalties. If Britain adopted the D-5 rather the C-4, it could be expected to retain commonality with the US systems throughout its projected service life.[77] (3) The D-5 missile would provide flexibility to cope with possible improvement of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defence throughout its service life.[78] (4) The additional capital cost of adopting the D-5 was assessed at September 1980 price as only some ￡390 million, or about 7 per cent increase of the total programme. It was a financially acceptable option.[79] As far as the submarines were concerned, the Vickers Shipyard and Engineering Ltd. was the primary contractor. The contract for the first British Trident submarine, Vanguard, was signed in April 1986. Vanguard, 15,900 tons dived, had twice the displacement of its predecessor, but a slightly smaller crew, at 132 compared to 149.[80] Like the Polaris submarines, its homeport would be located at Faslane, on the shore of Gare Loch, Strathclyde, Scotland. Vanguard would be armed with up to 16 12,000-kilometre range MIRVed missiles, less than 24 in the US’s Ohio.[81] The missiles would be stored and refurbished in King’s Bay, Georgia by the Americans. The first batch of British Trident warheads were completed in September 1992. They were designed by the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston, and were assembled at Aldermaston and Burghfield.[82] The warheads were thought to “Anglicise” the US W76, with perhaps the inclusion of some features from the US W88.[83] Warhead production continued into 1999, which was probably its last year of production. The Trident warheads were mated to the missiles on-board the submarine by RNAD at Coulport, eight miles from Faslane. HMS Vanguard took to the water on 5 May 1992. Twenty days later, the first Polaris boat, HMS Resolution retired.[84] On 14 August 1993, HMS Vanguard entered service. In 1995, 1996 and 1999, the other three boats, HMS Victorious, HMS Vigilant and HMS Vengeance respectively joined the RN.[85] The Vanguards were planned to remain in service until at least 2020. In the light of the Polaris precedent, the Naval Staff asked for the cost of Trident to be spread equally over the three services. This request, however, was rejected by Defence Minister John Nott because he thought Trident as a single-service responsibility.[86] Table 2-1. Comparison of the US and UK SLBMs SLBM First Deployed Range CEP (m) Max. yields ; Warhead; US Polaris A-3 1964 2,500nm/4,600km 900 3 × 200 kt (MRV) US Poseidon C-3 1971 2,500nm/4,600km 450 10 × 50 kt (MIRV) or 14 RV over reduced range (W76) US Trident C-4 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 賣屋  .